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Global consumption continues to generate growth in mining. In
lesser developed economies, this growth offers the potential to
generate new resources for development, but also creates chal-
lenges to sustainability in the regions in which extraction occurs.
This context leads to debate on the institutional arrangements
most likely to build synergies between mining, livelihoods, and
development, and on the socio-political conditions under which
such institutions can emerge. Building from a multiyear, three-
country program of research projects, Peru, a global center of
mining expansion, serves as an exemplar for analyzing the effects
of extractive industry on livelihoods and the conditions under
which arrangements favoring local sustainability might emerge.
This program is guided by three emergent hypotheses in human-
environmental sciences regarding the relationships among insti-
tutions, knowledge, learning, and sustainability. The research
combines in-depth and comparative case study analysis, and uses
mapping and spatial analysis, surveys, in-depth interviews, partic-
ipant observation, and our own direct participation in public
debates on the regulation ofmining for development. The findings
demonstrate the pressures that mining expansion has placed on
water resources, livelihood assets, and social relationships. These
pressures are a result of institutional conditions that separate the
governance of mineral expansion, water resources, and local
development, and of relationships of power that prioritize large
scale investment over livelihood and environment. A further prob-
lem is the poor communication between mining sector knowledge
systems and those of local populations. These results are consistent
with themes recently elaborated in sustainability science.
institutions  extractive industry  conflict  livelihood
Long-term global change trends drive the continuing expansionof mining (1–5). Among Organization for Economic Cooper-
ation and Development (OECD) countries, predictions that min-
eral demand declines at higher levels of national economic devel-
opment have not been borne out (1). Demand for minerals
continues to grow rapidly in emerging economies. Innovations in
mining technology make it economically possible to recover min-
erals from low grade deposits (6, 7). Meanwhile, new technologies,
including those intended to enhance sustainability, increase de-
mand for certainminerals. For example, battery-based automobiles
will lead to increased demand for lithium, 49% of the reserve base
of which is estimated to lie in the salt flats of Bolivia (8), whereas
policies that seek to substitute fossil fuel with nuclear energy will
require increased uranium mining.
These trends present serious challenges to sustainability. Extrac-
tive industry involves the permanent draw down of nonrenewable
resources, accounts for 20% of global greenhouse gas emissions
(9), and generates numerous local human-environment challenges.
We have examined these challenges since 1999 through sustained
field research on the relationships among extractive industry (min-
ing and hydrocarbons), environment, livelihoods, and institutional
change across eight case study regions (including 43 localities) in
Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia. Here, we focus on findings from Peru,
an exemplar for mining-sustainability themes. Drawing on work on
institutions, knowledge systems, and environmental change (10–
13), we ask: What are the human-environment impacts of mining?
What institutional factors help explain these impacts? Under what
conditions might institutional arrangements and social learning
foster local sustainable development in the presence of mining?
Our research was carried out in the three case study regions of
Southern Cajamarca, Cordillera Huayhuash in Ancash, and the
highlands of Piura (for further details on research sites, method-
ology, and instruments, see Tables S1–S3). Between 1990 and 2007,
Peru received US$12.35 billion in mining investments. It is the
leading silver producer of the world, second for copper and zinc,
fourth for lead, and sixth for gold. Peru ranked sixth in the world
in levels of investment in exploration in 2007 (4), and although the
financial downturn in 2009 has slowed the growth of some foreign
investment, the underlying drivers of global demand have not
changed, and copper, silver, and gold production are still growing
(14).
This level of activity could be an important vehicle for improving
Peruvian livelihoods. However, the evidence of positive effects is
weak, especially in rural areas (15–17). Indeed, mining has led to
increased social conflict. In 2007, thePeruvianOmbudsman’s office
recorded 78 conflicts in the country, 37 of which were socio-
environmental in kind, and 33 related to mining; by 2009, it
recorded 250 conflicts, of which 125 were socio-environmental in
kind, and 89 related to mining (18, 19). These conflicts are linked
to the mining-sustainability relationship, and are motivated by
concerns about livelihood security, environmental degradation, and
by the perception that well-being has not increased in proportion to
the profits of mining companies (20).
The importance of institutions in determining the quality of
development and natural resource management is well established
(5, 10, 21–24). However, in many cases, mineral expansion occurs
before adequate institutions are in place. Mechanisms to ensure
transparent use and distribution of money generated by mining are
often weak (24, 25), as are arrangements for transforming mineral
wealth into human development and environmental quality. These
institutional constraints help explain the social unrest driven by the
greed, grievance, uncertainty, and fear that often accompany
mining expansion (26). That such arrangements persist reflects the
political power of those who benefit from them, as well as central
government commitments to prioritize institutions that promote
foreign direct and large scale investments as a pathway to economic
growth (27). The presidents of Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia have
each made these commitments clear over the last 2 years (28).
Boundaries among knowledge systems also undermine sustain-
ability (12, 29). As mining expands, modern knowledge systems
responding to national and international objectives encounter live-
lihood-based knowledge grounded in local objectives (13). These
Author contributions: A.J.B. and J.T.B. designed research; A.J.B. and J.T.B. performed
research; A.J.B. and J.T.B. analyzed data; and A.J.B. and J.T.B. wrote the paper.
The authors declare no conflict of interest.
This article is a PNAS Direct Submission.
Freely available online through the PNAS open access option.
1Towhomcorrespondence should be addressed. E-mail: tony.bebbington@manchester.ac.uk.
This article contains supporting information online at www.pnas.org/cgi/content/full/
0906057106/DCSupplemental.
17296–17301  PNAS  October 13, 2009  vol. 106  no. 41 www.pnas.orgcgidoi10.1073pnas.0906057106
knowledge systems have distinct criteria of credibility and legiti-
macy, and distinct normative conceptions of how things should be.
Managing the boundaries between these systems is essential for
local sustainability, and is a particular challenge given that some
actors involved possess far more information and power than do
others.
Boundaries have to be managed not only for purposes of medi-
ation, but also for learning and performance (12, 13). For local
knowledge systems aiming to understand, adapt to and take ad-
vantage of change, ‘‘learning from experience is particularly slow,
so identifying new alliances of local and science-based knowledge
systems to speed up this acquisition is particularly important’’ (refs.
13 and 30, p. 850). The mining sector also needs to learn from local
systems as it enters new and complex environments for which its
knowledge may be inadequate. One study concludes that in 19 of
25 United States mines studied, model-based assessments failed to
predict that water sources would be contaminated at levels exceed-
ing United States standards. This inaccuracy was due to mitigation
failures, as well as errors in geochemical and hydrologic character-
ization of mined materials and mine areas (31).
Research on these boundaries has generated a set of quasi
hypotheses about institutions, knowledge, and learning that cross-
cut the various communities engaged in human-environment and
sustainability themes. These are: (i) sustainability enhancing, re-
source governance institutions have to be built before resource
based growth occurs (24); (ii) where asymmetries of power exist,
social conflict is often the catalyst for the crafting of institutions that
foster more sustainable resource management (20); and (iii) insti-
tutions of resource governance that allow local participation are
more likely to succeed than institutions imposed from outside (32).
This study undertakes an empirically based, qualitative assess-
ment of these hypotheses for mining in Peru. It does so by
addressing which institutional arrangements need to be created to
increase synergies between mining, environment, and livelihoods,
whether such institutions can be crafted if mineral expansion has
already begun, and what role sustainability science might have in
building these institutions and enhancing synergies. We emphasize
mining and Peru because there are no single-model panaceas for
resource management and arrangements must be crafted to fit
particular contexts (10, 11). The Peruvian example allows us to ask,
under conditions of conflict: Can feasible institutional arrange-
ments emerge for managing the relationships between mining and
livelihoods, and between expert and local knowledge systems, and
what would these arrangements be?
Results
Mining and Sustainability Challenges in Peru. Minerals account for
62% of the exports of Peru, and the mining boom of the country
has helped foster sustained economic growth, running at 8%
growth (per annum) by 2008 (4). Fig. 1 illustrates the effects of this
growth on the long-term trend of mining concessions. Since 1990,
89% of all of the area ever claimed for mining has been given over
as concessions (33). Currently, there are 33,963 activemining claims
that cover 13,997 km2, 11% of the country (for entire time series,
see SI Materials and Methods and Fig. S1). Certain regions have
witnessed particular acceleration in the area affected by claims (Fig.
2; Fig. S2). Although only some concessions become active mines,
the extent of concessions indicates: (i) the types of mining-
livelihood-environment relationships that central government is
willing to countenance; (ii) the distribution and location of potential
mining activities in relation to other social and environmental
factors; and (iii) the predisposition of the mining sector to invest.
This growth has occurred in an institutional context that hinders
the alignment of mining and sustainability. Until 2008, Peru did not
have a Ministry of Environment, and responsibilities for granting
concessions, promoting mining, regulating its environmental and
social impacts, and approving the Environmental Impact State-
ments of companies were all vested in the Ministry of Energy and
Mines (MEM), creating an evident conflict of interests. There has
been no requirement that concessions are aligned with local gov-
ernment plans for development, land use, ecological zoning, or
water management. Nor has there been consultation with local
populations before the granting of concessions, even though Peru
is signatory to the International Labor Organization Convention
169, which stipulates the right of indigenous people to prior
consultation and to free, prior, and informed consent before any
relocation from their lands. Existing institutions favor promotion of
mining over its regulation or its synergy with local livelihoods and
environment. Similar arrangements have been documented in
Africa (34).
The surge in mining concessions has been accompanied by
mergers and takeovers among transnational mining companies and
the use of new technologies that require large capital expenditures,
leading companies to request larger concessions (35). Companies
with 20,000 or more hectares account for 46% of all mining
claims, and 10 operators control 3,486 km2 of concessions in Peru
(Table S4). This concentration introduces immense imbalances of
power in the countryside between companies and communities,
and raises issues about land use change and water resources.
Mining, Water, and Livelihoods. Concessions have been granted in
the upper reaches of watersheds, with 33% of claims located at
4,000 meters above sea level (masl) and 58% at 3000 masl
(Table S5). Table 1 shows the extent of concessions in watersheds
that supply water to most of the major cities in Peru and its coastal
agriculture. Watersheds supplying the cities of Lima, Trujillo,
Chiclayo, and Ica each have 30% or more of their surface under
concession. Fig. 3 shows the concentration of concessions in the
headwaters of the rivers supplying greater Lima. Larger portions of
watershed surfaces are affected in Cajamarca (Fig. S3). This
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Fig. 1. Mining claims in Peru 1990-January, 2008.
Fig. 2. Mining claims, Cajamarca, 1990–2008.













under pressure. Lima and other cities face serious long-term water
supply constraints after a decade of precipitation deficits and the
disappearance since 1970 of approximately one-quarter of the
glaciers supplying coastal watersheds (36).Water-dependent export
agriculture is also increasing rapidly on the coast. Meanwhile, 29%
of the population has no access to piped water, and more than half
of the major rivers used for water supplies are contaminated by
accumulated mining, hydrocarbons, and human waste (37).
Mining has potential adverse effects on livelihoods primarily
through its impacts on land and water resources. In Piura, Ca-
jamarca, and Ancash, land rights were initially held individually or
collectively by peasant communities. These rights gave access to
natural resources that served as livelihood assets, reserves for future
use, items of consumption, and sources of cultural identity. To
conduct exploration and install operations, companies need access
to these surface land rights. The impact that this transfer of rights
has on livelihoods is compensated through the price paid for the
land, offers of employment, and community development pro-
grams. In Cajamarca, 59 randomly sampled households from three
communities (23% of total community population) affected by
mining activities experienced significant, although short-term, in-
creases in access to medical and educational services through
community development programs. Between 1992 and 2000, US$5
million was paid to 250 households in 44 communities in return
for land transfers to mining companies (15, 38). Such payments can
have positive short-term effects, although rarely enhance the sus-
tainability of livelihoods because of shifts from durable natural
assets to less durable (if more flexible) financial assets. Our 2005
follow-up case-study research with 52 randomly sampled house-
holds from four communities (13%of total community population)
affected by mining activities indicated that although almost all
households either sold land to the mine or were involved in many
of the community development programs the mine administered,
only 56 and 29%, respectively, of households reported increased
access to health services and schooling. Also, 45% of households
indicated that their overall annual financial incomes had declined,
and 86% reported no increase in cattle and sheep holdings, the
primary sources of household income.
Mining activities have fundamentally altered the spatial extent of
livelihood resource bases, leading to unsustainable intensification
and increasing livelihood insecurity. Our 2005 research shows
households struggling to maintain livestock herds because high
elevation grazing lands are now occupied by mining activities (Fig.
S3); 61% of households temporarily intensified agriculture to
compensate for loss of grazing lands. This intensification has
reduced fallow periods and, respondents believe, decreased soil
fertility. In 2003, 95% of interviewees in the two communities most
affected by mining operations indicated that fallow periods have
shortened considerably because of the need for fodder crops.
Mining activities in Cajamarca have also led to outmigration. In
2003,75% of households in the 44 communities that sold land to
mines between 1992 and 2000 had moved to neighboring commu-
nities at lower elevations. Also, 17%of households that sold parcels
of land moved to the city of Cajamarca. According to interviews
with a 10% sample of households from nine communities who sold
land to themine, more than half were unable to purchase new lands
equal to their previous holdings due to price inflation, forcing them
to migrate in search of housing and new livelihoods (38).
Water is needed in large quantities for mineral production and
processing. The adverse impacts on water quality early on in the life
of several post-1990 mines in Peru have generated particular
concern and conflict. A synthesis of several years of water chemistry
findings from environmental impact and water monitoring studies
in Cajamarca show water quality downstream of the largest gold
mine in Peru often failed to meet company, MEM or Ministry of
Health standards (Table S6). Community respondents report in-
creased problems of human, animal, and fish ill-health, and dete-
rioration in water smell, taste, and cloudiness.
At all our sites, a recurrent issue in debates on water quality and
quantity is the difference between indicators used by residents and
by the mining sector. Residents’ indicators are typically vernacular
and based on everyday monitoring of the landscape; the indicators
of the mining sector are quantitative and based on structured
monitoring programs (30). Although residents distrust quantitative
indicators, because they do not understand them and the data are
often produced by scientists contracted by mining companies, the
mining sector has no faith in vernacular indicators. Although the
mining sector insists that the use of new technologies means that
the negative impacts of twentieth century mining will not be
repeated, residents remain skeptical given historical associations
betweenmining, contamination, andpoverty, aswell asmore recent
mitigation failures.
Concerns about impacts on water also underlie resistance to
mining in Piura. Interviews in four sectors of the community








Cajamarca (Cajamarca) 4993 64
Chancay (Chiclayo) 4960 45
Jequetepeque (Cajamarca) 4726 41
Santa (Huaraz) 11789 41
Lurin (Lima) 1738 41
Moche (Trujillo) 2423 41
Rimac (Lima) 3584 40
Moquegua (Moquegua) 3516 38
Cutervo (Cajamarca) 2719 34
Chicama (Cajamarca) 6181 32
Apurimac (Huanuco) 41474 31
Chillon (Lima) 2566 30
Ica (Ica) 6930 29
Madre de Dios (Madre de Dios) 19011 27
Mantaro (Huanuco) 34307 26
Apurimac (Andahualyas) 23405 21
Maran˜on (Northeastern valleys) 43411 20
Chotano/Maran˜on (Cajamarca) 14750 18
Chiria (Piura) 10948 18
Piura (Piura) 11718 17
Chili (Arequipa) 12657 17
Totals 267805
Fig. 3. Mining claims in watersheds feeding Lima.
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Segunda y Cajas showed that residents’ primary concerns regarded
the effect that mining would have on the quality and quantity of
water. Civil society and church organizations expressed the same
fear. In 2003, 60% of irrigating farmers from the four case study
communities in Cajamarca reported reduced water availability,
believing that this was due to new mining operations. Rural and
urban interviews since 1999 consistently show the dominance of
water concerns.
Responding to these pressures, some companies adopt technol-
ogies to reduce impacts on water. A proposed large copper mine in
Piura says it will use technologies thatmaximize water recycling and
avoid use of inorganic reagents. In Cajamarca, mines have re-
sponded to conflicts over deteriorating water quality and a large
mercury accident by instigating drinking water programs. In 1996,
only 3% of households in the 2003 case study communities had
access to piped water resources; by 2005, 85% of households had
received new piped water connections over half of which were
installed by the mining company. Companies also aim to offset
negative effects on land and water by creating new assets through
agricultural production, education, and infrastructure programs.
The effects on livelihood sustainability are mixed. One transna-
tional company in Cajamarca is thoroughly rethinking its program
on the grounds that, over its 15 years of operation, it has had little
success in enhancing livelihood sustainability (39). Repeat inter-
views since 2004 with the community relations team reveal growing
staff recognition that these programs have encouraged clientelism,
increased inequality, and failed to mitigate conflicts.
Therefore, other mechanisms are required to translate the value
of extracted natural capital into new livelihood assets and oppor-
tunities. Since 2004, the main instrument has been a tax transfer
arrangement, in which a proportion (currently, 50%) of tax paid by
the mine returns to the mine-affected region. However, most local
authorities have inadequate staff and skills to establish priorities or
implement significant investment projects, andMinistry of Finance
rules have prevented use of mine-tax transfers to strengthen
technical capacity of municipal government. At a national level, tax
transfers are associated with increased conflict because of these
problems. In response, the International Finance Corporation
(IFC) aimed to develop this capacity in Cajamarca. In 2008, local
mayors reported improvements; other elected officials interviewed
were less sanguine.
Mining and Conflicts.Maps of mining concessions can be viewed as
maps of uncertainty. Once communities become aware that a
concession has been granted on their land, their future becomes
unclear. People possess inadequate information regarding the
implications of such concessions, and the information they do
receive has problems of salience, legitimacy, and credibility (12).
Interviewees have often requested information from us, because
often they neither understand nor trust information given to them
by mining companies, the MEM, or environmental groups.
Differences exist not only regarding knowledge claims about how
things are, but also how things should be. Conflicting views exist
regarding the rights that mining companies and residents have, and
the relative weight of these respective rights. Such discrepancies
manifest themselves in different claims on the landscape. Fig. 4
shows mining rights in the Huayhuash region of Ancash, and their
overlap with community controlled private conservation districts,
which reflect a quite different view of how the landscape should be
managed. According to our interviews in four communities in the
region, this spatial disjunction has led to conflicts between different
legal, constitutional, and cultural interpretations of rights.
Across all of the case studies, residents’ ability to express their
views during exploration and exploitation is often obstructed,
because key decisions are made far away in Lima, and local actors
feel far less at ease in the formal environments of Lima than do
mining officials. Also, grievance procedures do not work well for
local populations (18). Feeling that there are few or no possibilities
to elicit government response to their concerns, local populations
frequently conclude that violent conflict is the only way to make
their knowledge count. Each of our research sites has seen such
violence, with loss of life in Cajamarca and Piura.
This situation makes the work of communication, translation,
and mediation at the boundary between mining and livelihood
knowledge systems at once important and difficult (12). In each of
Piura and Cajamarca, individuals and groups attempting to have
this role have done so from already established positions of
leadership and legitimacy. Several of these ‘‘boundary mediators’’
have been linked to the Church, some to nongovernmental orga-
nizations (NGOs), and others to research and educational institu-
tions. However, in an environment of ‘‘if you are not for us you are
against us,’’ it is difficult to sustain this role. Interested parties have
actively undermined mediators’ legitimacy with public and private
claims that they are biased.When church related groups in highland
Piura have posed the question ‘‘might it be possible for mining and
livelihoods to coexist?,’’ activists criticize them for being ‘‘pro-
mining.’’ Meanwhile, in both sites, NGOs and religious figures
aiming to mediate while at the same time raising concerns about
mining’s adverse effects on the environment or human rights have
been publicly criticized by government, companies, and the media
as antidevelopment and even terrorists. The most effective medi-
ator between these different views on rights and knowledge has
been the Ombudsman’s office, a state institution that is indepen-
dent of the Executive and answers directly to Congress. Although
some companies (as in Piura) question the credibility and impar-
tiality of the Ombudsman’s analysis, it has greater legitimacy with
the different parties than do any of the other potential boundary
managers.
Discussion
The local sustainability challenges generated by mining expan-
sion depend on: the effects on residents’ access to land and
water; the effects on water quality; whether lost livelihood assets
have been compensated by new, durable assets; and the effects
on residents’ belief in the legitimacy and credibility of informa-
tion. As literature on institutions and the environment would
suggest (10, 11, 13, 17, 40), to secure such sustainability requires
social processes that lead to the creation of more effective
institutions for managing relationships between mining, land,
water, and people, and between mine-based and livelihood-
based knowledge systems. The Peruvian case suggests elements
of such processes.
Fig. 4. Mining claims and community level private conservation areas in the
Cordillera Huayhuash, Ancash.













Sources and Qualities of Institutional Innovation. Since 2004, there
have been national and local institutional innovations that have the
potential to enhance environmental quality and allow the conver-
sion of subsoil natural assets into local development. Four national
changes are important. First, since 2004, mining tax and royalty
systems have changed in ways that ensure significant fiscal transfers
to mine affected areas. These changes generated a new challenge,
increasing local conflict due to the ways in which local governments
managed these resources (16). The challenge led to a pilot program
to strengthen municipal capacities, although this program has not
been rolled out on a national basis, and Ministry of Economy and
Finance rules prevent municipalities from using tax transfer re-
sources for capacity building.
The third and fourth changes constitute steps, if incomplete,
toward improving environmental regulation. In 2008, a Ministry of
Environment was created, potentially a significant change for
natural resource governance. However, the Executive, the MEM,
and the mining sector have each resisted giving it the role of
regulating the environmental impacts of mining. Consequently,
Environmental Impact Statements are still approved by the MEM.
Although the role of monitoring the environmental effects of
operating mines has recently been passed to a third party, this body
is the regulatory authority for the energy sector, which has no prior
expertise on environmental issues.
Each of these changes has occurred in contexts of social conflict.
Conflicts with communities led mining companies to favor the first
change; local conflicts over the use of tax transfers led to the second
change; international conflicts over the Free Trade Agreement
with the United States and over gas development in the Amazon
preceded the creation of theMinistry of Environment; and growing
public criticism of the partiality of the MEM preceded the fourth.
Although social conflicts encouraged change, actual innovations
occurred because of lobbying by specific actors, in particularNGOs,
the Ombudsman’s Office, International Financial Institutions, and
certain mining companies. The Ombudsman’s Office has recog-
nized in interviews that the existence of social conflict has made it
possible for them to promote specific institutional innovations.
However, these changes remain incomplete because of resistance
from the mining sector, Ministry of Economy and Finance, and the
Executive.
Local institutional changes have also occurred. For example,
participatory water monitoring has advanced in Cajamarca. This
change originated in conflicts that led the Compliance Advisor
Ombudsman (CAO) of the IFC to intervene. Given that the IFC
is a part owner of the Yanacochamine, the impartiality of the CAO
has been questioned by local groups. Nonetheless, many stakehold-
ers recognize the value of the water monitoring system that it
initiated through an external consultant. In response to subsequent
conflicts, the company has established additional participatory
monitoring of water courses (often, again, with the mediation of
third parties). The weakness of such initiatives is that they emerge
in response to conflicts, rather than before the onset of mining
activity, and were initiated by the company and its owners. How-
ever, they do allow for the joint involvement of scientists and
stakeholders to monitor against both technical and vernacular
water indicators. In some instances, this effort has identified
contamination, providing a modest measure of local recognition.
Over the last 2 years, there have been attempts to build from such
experiences and link participatory water monitoring initiatives
across Peru. Although many mines believe that their technological
innovations have genuinely reducedwater resource impacts, they do
not view such monitoring as threatening. Also, if monitoring were
to identify problems, themines can respond to them iteratively with
additional treatment and infrastructural investments (as has hap-
pened in Cajamarca). For the most part, monitoring identifies
tensions between mining, livelihoods, and environment that can be
resolved.
In another example, participatory ecological zoning allows the
combination of local and expert assessments of the functions and
appropriate uses of land, and is essential if mining expansion is to
be better aligned with existing livelihood and watershed geogra-
phies.Our interviewswithmining companies show that the industry
is resistant to this type of institutional change, and views zoning as
an unacceptable attempt to place areas off-limits tomining. Zoning
initiatives have begun in both Piura and Cajamarca. However, they
have been promoted by NGOs in conjunction with allies within
district and regional government, unlike water monitoring, which
has often been enabled by the industry. The NGOs involved have
been careful to avoid the label of being ‘‘anti-mining.’’ Although
they speak out on issues of environment and human rights, some
senior staff members also participate in off-camera working groups
with the industry and the PrimeMinister’s office. They also struggle
to persuade other activists that zoning should be viewed as a
planning tool and not an instrument to stop mining. Between the
hostility of mining companies and the zeal of activists, it is difficult
to protect ecological zoning as a process that mediates between
divergent interests and knowledge systems rather than simply
reaffirming already established boundaries.
These local institutional innovations mark steps toward sustain-
ability. They also have emerged because of opportunities opened by
social conflicts and have then been converted into institutional
innovations by actors who, for distinct reasons, have had the power
and legitimacy to do this. Once again, resistance to these innova-
tions means they remain incomplete.
Sustainability Science and Incomplete Institutional Innovations. An-
alyzing the emergence of these institutional innovations helps
understand the possibilities of fostering institutional change once
expansion of extractive industry has already occurred. Likewise,
understanding the roles had by mediators and institutional inno-
vators illuminates the possible contributions of sustainability sci-
ence. Like themediating organizations and individuals that we have
noted, practitioners of sustainability science would also operate at
the boundaries between mining and livelihood based knowledge
systems. Operating in these contexts, scientists are faced with a
similar set of contradictory demands to those encountered by the
mediators in Piura and Cajamarca.
First, information and knowledge must be salient, credible, and
legitimate (12, 40) to be ‘‘truly useful’’ in regard to real-world
practice. The problem must be deemed important, and its under-
standing come from trustworthy sources, based on accepted rules.
Second, to achieve these characteristics, knowledge must be pro-
duced with stakeholders (12, 30, 41–43). Its effectiveness in medi-
ating conflict depends on its legitimacy with a range of stakeholders
(12), many of whom have opposed positions. If sustainability
scientists are to produce knowledge that diverse actors accept as
credible, then they must coproduce knowledge with these different
actors at the same time as bridging conflictive relationships through
the process of research itself. This challenge implies coproducing
knowledge with stakeholders whose interests are opposed. How-
ever, some knowledge is simply too specialized to be coproduced.
Therefore, great care must be taken to produce it in ways deemed
independent, objective, and verifiable by independent third parties.
In Peru, such specialist knowledge often fails to contribute to
sustainability, because it is produced by, or under contract to,
mining companies, and because it is too technical to be intelligible
to most local stakeholders. Third, sustainability scientists face the
challenge of combining independence with adherence to their own
principles. Pursuing this combination requires finding a way to
endorse specific institutional innovations while also retaining legit-
imacy with actors who disagree with them, a combination that
mediators in Peru have sought by combining public commitments
to institutional changes with off-camera roles to sustain relation-
ships with all parties. Fourth, appropriate institutional innovations
(and appropriate means of introducing them) cannot be blue-
printed (11). They must fit with the context in which they operate
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(10). This requirement means that, like Peruvian mediators, sus-
tainability scientists will also require much local knowledge and
field expertise.
These findings resonate with other research on institutions,
knowledge, and sustainability, suggesting a way forward to meld
research and practice. Following Ostrom (11), we conclude that
there are no panaceas when it comes to institutional design.
Following Young (10, 44), and Clark and coworkers (13), we
conclude that institutions shape knowledge generation, and that to
generate knowledge that is salient, credible, and legitimate (12, 40)
requires institutions that facilitate dialogue among holders of
different types of knowledge. Also, following Clark and coworkers
(40), we conclude that such institutions can be built, although this
will be a difficult process that encounters resistance.
Conclusions
The Peruvian case speaks to key hypotheses on institutions and
sustainability. It suggests that, when resource based growth
precedes institutional innovation, serious sustainability prob-
lems will emerge. However, it also suggests that, under certain
conditions, sustainability enhancing institutions can be created
even after resource booms have begun. One condition for this
institutional innovation is the presence of social conflict that
leads to demands for institutional change; the other is the
presence of actors that can translate this conflict into specific
institutional innovations. Conflict, adequately brokered, can
offset asymmetries of power and allow institutional change. Even
in conflictive situations, institutions that allow local ownership
can progress and be more effective than centrally imposed
institutions that are mostly designed to foster economic growth.
Materials and Methods
Our findings were generated through three linked research projects in Peru,
Ecuador, and Bolivia examining areas affected by the expansion of new
extractive industries in the Andes. The case study research combines qualita-
tive andquantitativedata collectionandanalysis techniques (formoredetails,
see SI Materials and Methods).
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